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A lthough economic history will record that the Michigan recession probably began sometime in 2006, the West Michigan economy was able to avoid the impact of the 
impending economic downturn until late in the summer of 
2008. Lest there be any doubt, the recession is now upon us. 
We entered the year fully aware that numerous economic 
problems were simmering in the background. The tightening 
of loan requirements and a wave of foreclosures in response 
to the subprime crisis resulted in a slumping housing market. 
Auto finance and every other form of consumer credit were 
being severely restricted. Auto sales were edging lower, and 
the anxiety level regarding the viability of our local economy 
began to increase. 
However, the valuation of the dollar compared to other world 
currencies was still very low. Declines in automotive and housing 
were being offset by strong demands for export goods, including 
those associated with the aircraft, machinery, and agricultural 
industries. On a nationwide basis, job losses in Michigan were 
being offset by job gains in other parts of the country. 
For money managers around the world, a dilemma developed. 
Although it has been well over 60 years since the infamous 
Breton Woods monetary conference, about 65% of the world’s 
currency reserves are still in dollars. With the sub-prime 
mortgage problem still far from being resolved, investing in 
“packaged” mortgages was now considered less desirable and 
downright risky. The Federal Reserve continued to cut interest 
rates, making treasury securities far less profitable. As the price 
of gold and other commodities started to rise, numerous money 
managers around the world decided to jump on the bandwagon 
of commodity speculation. Prices for commodities like cobalt, 
lead, copper, and zinc vaulted to record levels, severely straining 
the profitability of many of our local firms that depend on these 
types of raw material for manufacturing their finished products. 
The rising price of coal, iron ore, and steel scrap escalated the 
price of steel to record levels. Predominantly, the producers of 
these commodities cited demand by Chinese manufacturers as 
the major cause of these escalations, although some acknowledge 
that commodity speculation was also playing a role. As oil rose 
to the range of $150 per barrel, even the OPEC countries argued 
that at least half of that price was the result of speculation rather 
than actual market demand.
By late summer, the record price for gasoline was creating 
major deterrent to auto sales. Although the 2007 gasoline 
price hike to $3.50 was largely ignored at the time, the 2008 
spike to over $4.30 per gallon jolted consumers into a new 
sense of reality. There was a newfound revival of the discussion 
about alternative forms of energy. However, by midsummer, 
gasoline consumption had fallen by 5%, and dealer lots began 
to overflow with heretofore beloved SUVs and pickup trucks. 
Firms like General Motors that had banked their future on 
these high-margin vehicles were starting to bleed. 
As we entered the fall of 2008, the speculation binge had run 
its course, and price for most commodities began to plummet. 
The British banks and many of the European banks had 
somehow managed to follow our lead into a sub-prime mess 
of their own, resulting in a significant international economic 
decline which still has not run its course. 
For most of our local industrial groups, there became no place 
to hide. The office furniture business had already started to 
soften in 2007, and many firms began to see significantly 
lower demand by late summer. Our local auto parts suppliers, 
who have lived between the proverbial rock and a hard 
place for years, were now having orders slashed to match 
the declining production schedules. Even those firms that 
had won contracts with the Japanese and Korean transplant 
companies have found that the automotive slump was now 
encompassing the entire industry. 
About the Survey
The monthly survey of business condition, published under the 
title of “Current Business Trends,” first debuted in Kalamazoo in 
February of 1979 and was expanded to Grand Rapids in 1988. At 
present, the survey encompasses 45 purchasing managers from 
ISM-Greater Grand Rapids, and 25 from N.A.P.M. Southwestern 
Michigan. For both surveys, the respondents are purchasing 
managers from the region’s major industrial manufacturers, 
distributors, and industrial service organizations. 
Patterned after the nationwide survey conducted by the 
Institute for Supply Management, the strength of the survey is 
its simplicity. Each month, the respondents are asked to rate 
eight factors as “SAME” or stable, “UP” or improving/rising, 
OR “Down” as in declining/falling. 
New Orders
This index measures new business coming into the firm 
and signifies business improvement or business decline. 
When this index is positive for an extended period of time, 
it implies that the firm or organization will soon need to 
purchase more raw materials and services, hire more people, 
or possibly expand facilities. This results in billions of 
dollars being added to the economy when the index of New 
Orders is positive, but conversely means that billions of 
dollars are being pulled from the economy when the index 
turns negative. Depending on the firm, a significant portion 
of this money ends up being spent — or not spent — in the 
local community. 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the positive trend of early 2007 was 
eroding by the end of the year. A small uptick in January 2008 
flattened for the next couple of months. By April, incoming 
orders began to soften, although a flat report in June gave 
fleeting hope that the storm may have passed. However, one 
month does not make a trend, and the index eroded for the 
rest of the year, finishing at -57, the lowest level in the 20-year 
history of the survey. 
Figure 1: 2007–2008 NEW ORDERS
Percent “Up” vs. “Down”
Production
The production schedules vary widely among different types 
of manufacturing firms. Some, such as automotive, are 
highly seasonal. Others build for inventory in anticipation 
of orders, while others ship immediately upon completion. 
Holidays, bad weather, and materials shortages may 
constitute uncontrollable influences. 
Production schedules for 2007 ended on a negative note, but 
briefly rebounded in early 2008. However, from April of 2008 
forward, the index was consistently negative, and finished the 
year at its lowest level. As noted by Figure 2, most of the year was 
zigzag from one month to the next, indicating that many firms 
were having at least some difficulty adjusting to market demand.
 Figure 2: 2007–2008 PRODUCTION 
 Percent “Up” vs. “Down”
Industrial Inflation
For most buyers of major commodities such as plastic resins, 
steel, copper, and motor fuel, 2008 will be remembered as 
a year of the wildest price swings in history. January and 
February of 2008 saw industrial inflation ballooning as 
the prices of key commodities like steel, oil, copper, and 
aluminum began rising rapidly. By April, many industrial 
buyers were seeing the worst inflation they had seen in their 
careers. It seemed like there was no end in sight. 
Unfortunately, commodity speculators jumped in to run prices 
even higher. In May, we reported a 20-year record high for the 
index of Prices at +76, only to see the same index slide to a 
record low of -58 in December. Figure 3 shows the extreme 
nature of these price swings over what is a relatively short 
period of time. In late November, one survey respondent was 
quoted as saying that he was now purchasing flat rolled steel 
for 20% of the price he had paid only four months earlier. 
Whereas everyone likes a “good deal,” price drops of this 
nature can be detrimental to the industry as a whole. 
From an industrial buyer’s perspective, one of the biggest 
dangers of any downturn of this nature is what the economists 
refer to as “structural damage.” Simply put, marginal firms in 
a particular industry are driven out of the business, as they 
probably should be, under Darwinian economics. However, 
altogether too often this washout extends to firms that are 
otherwise good performers, or even worse, the high quality/
higher price firms. They find themselves undercut by cheaper 
domestic competitors or foreign sources. When the markets 
finally correct themselves, there is not enough market capacity, 
and the surviving firms can now charge a higher price, fueling 
inflation as well as more foreign competition. 
As of December, for some commodities such as plastic resins 
and petrochemicals, prices have not come down nearly as fast 
as they went up. As we enter 2009, we will see the prices of 
many of these types of commodities continue to fall. 
Compounding the problem of falling prices is the problem 
of inventory liquidation. When we look back at 2008, we 
will remember it as the year that we abandon the religion of 
JIT inventory, probably in response to the panic created by 
pricing for some commodities going out of control. As prices 
continue to fall, firms are now utilizing these inventories, 
resulting in the prices for these commodities falling even 
further. Unfortunately, the entire world is now cleaning the 
warehouses that were overfilled in last summer’s buying panic. 
Historically, we will not be out of our current recession until 
the inventory liquidation is over. In the past, this kind of 
liquidation has usually taken about 9 months. However, these 
are unprecedented times, and the past rules may not apply.
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Figure 3: 2007 – 2008 PRICES
Percent Reporting “Up” vs. “Down”
Employment
The Employment index measures the expansion and 
contraction of the firm’s entire workforce, including office and 
production personnel. Many firms will remain stable for long 
periods of time, until significant economic events result in new 
hires or layoffs. Others will add or subtract people one or two 
at a time. 
In the last half of 2007, our index of Employment turned 
negative. As noted in Figure 4, this workforce reduction was 
inexplicably halted in February of 2008, although the same 
negative pattern would soon return by early spring. The pace 
of layoffs accelerated in late summer and cascaded to a record 
low in November.
Figure 4: 2007– 2008 EMPLOYMENT
Percent Reporting “Up” vs. “Down”
Looking Ahead to 2009
An unfortunate feature of the capitalistic market systems of 
the world is that they are periodically prone to recessions. This 
particular recession is more troublesome than most because 
it affects the production and monetary systems of the entire 
world. Unlike the shallow recession of 2001, the Federal 
Reserve was able to mitigate the dot com bust by simply 
lowering interest rates. With cheap money available, the auto 
makers propped up sagging sales with numerous rebates and 
low finance rates. 
The causes of this recession are far deeper and more 
widespread. However, like other recessions, this too shall pass. 
Here are some clues that recovery may be underway:
First, watch for the prices of the major commodities to 
stabilize. Most experts agree that the prices for oil, copper, 
aluminum, and numerous other key commodities are below 
what it costs to produce them. Hence, we will watch for our 
index of Prices to return to some kind of equilibrium, and 
sustain the equilibrium for at least two or three months. We 
should watch the ISM national index of Prices as well. 
Second, keep an eye on China. Since the Chinese are new at 
the whole science of managing inventories, chances are good 
that they are overstocked on just about every major industrial 
commodity. Of course, we need to watch the performance of 
the overall Chinese economy. When China resumes buying 
significant quantities of industrial commodities, it should be 
regarded as a positive sign. 
Third, watch for a rebound in the New Orders index. Keep in 
mind that these orders are often placed weeks or even months 
before any money is actually paid. Sustained double digit 
growth in this index is a strong indication that the economy is 
on the mend. 
Fourth, watch for recovery of the international economies. 
International economic news will provide at least some clues. 
The J.P. Morgan Global Manufacturing Index may provide 
additional evidence. 
Fifth, there must be a return to price stability in the housing 
market. When home values are still falling, buyers are 
reluctant to buy, and banks are reluctant to loan. Statistics like 
housing starts, sale of existing homes, and reports from local, 
state, and national real estate organizations may be helpful. 
As previously noted, this recession is far more complicated 
than most. Speculation regarding potential duration is therefore 
more difficult. However, the best guess at this time is that 
recovery should start to be evident by mid to late summer. ■
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